What is Privacy? The History and Definition of Privacy by Lukács, Adrienn
256 
WHAT IS PRIVACY? THE HISTORY AND DEFINITION OF 
PRIVACY 
 
Adrienn Lukács 
University of Szeged, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, Department of Labour Law and 
Social Security and Sorbonne Law School Université Paris 1, PhD student, 
lukacs.adrienn@juris.u-szeged.hu 
 
Abstract 
The protection of privacy cannot be separated from technological development: nowadays, due 
to the development of science and technology, the possibility to intrude into someone’s privacy 
has increased. The law has to react to these changes, ensuring the legal protection of privacy. 
However, in order to ensure this protection, first of all it is necessary to determine the subject 
of this protection: privacy. 
Privacy itself is as old as mankind, however, it was not always a legally protected right. What 
is considered to be private and what is legally protected as private can differ. One of the most 
important issues concerning legal privacy protection is that - according to several privacy 
scholars and the European Court of Human Rights - it is not possible to give an exhaustive legal 
definition of the subject of privacy protection. The importance of privacy can be related to the 
fact that privacy has a very close connection with human dignity, freedom and independence of 
the individual, and it is more and more challenged in the age of the rapid technological 
development of the information society. The aim of the study is to present the historical 
development of privacy in order to better understand the concept of privacy and to find a 
solution to how privacy can be effectively protected in the information society. First, I am going 
to discuss the short history of privacy, then its already existing definitions, then the way 
international - especially European - legal regulations regulate the protection of private life, and 
finally I am going to outline the current challenges posed by the information society. As a result 
of my study, I will make some recommendations about how the existing regulations should 
protect privacy nowadays. 
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1. Introduction and aims 
 
Privacy has known a long development throughout history; it is as old as mankind. However, 
what is considered to be private differs according to the era, the society and the individual. Also 
what is considered to be private and what is legally protected as private can differ [1]. A very 
important step was the creation of the modern privacy notion, which first appeared in the 
famous study (The Right to Privacy) written by Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren in 1890. In 
this paper the authors defined the right to privacy as “the right to be let alone”. Since then, the 
right to privacy has become widely known and acknowledged, started to evolve and became a 
fundamental human right in occidental societies. In spite of the fact that legal systems ensure 
the protection of privacy, there is no consensus on the question: what exactly has to be protected, 
what is privacy? Several great jurists made attempts to create a definition of privacy, but due to 
its inconceivability, the on-going changing of the elements belonging to the private sphere of 
the individual, most of these definitions only highlight an aspect of it.  
My aim is to point out that in spite of the long history of privacy and legal scholars dealing with 
it for centuries, privacy is still a key issue and raises a lot of questions to be answered. I will 
also give a solution to how the lack of definition of privacy can be handled, and what 
international legal regulations should be taken into consideration in order to effectively protect 
privacy in the era of the rapid technological development of the 21st century. 
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2. Early history of privacy and the right to privacy 
 
In spite of the fact that privacy only became a generally accepted right in the 19th-20th century, 
privacy had existed long before this era. Privacy has a very long history, it has its origins already 
in the ancient societies. Even the Bible has some passages where the violation of privacy 
appeared in its early form, where shame and anger followed the intrusion into someone’s private 
sphere. It is enough to think of Adam and Eve, who started to cover their bodies with leaves in 
order to preserve their privacy [2]. From a legal point of view, the Code of Hammurabi 
contained a paragraph against the intrusion into someone’s home, or the Roman law also 
regulated the same question [3]. The idea of privacy traditionally comes from the difference 
between “private” and “public” [4], which distinction comes from the natural need – as old as 
mankind – of the individual to make a distinction between himself/herself and the  
outer world [5]. Of course the limits between private and public differ according to the given 
era and society [6], which will cause the on-going change throughout history of what people 
consider private [7]. 
For lack of space, I will just highlight some of the most important eras of history. In the ancient 
societies people had a relatively limited possibility for self-determination as their (private) lives 
were strongly influenced by the state. Plato illustrates this phenomenon in his dialogue the 
Laws, where the complete life of the individual was determined by the state and its aims, there 
was no place for individual freedom and autonomy. Thus the book describes a very extreme 
state (which in totality was never realised), some elements of it came true in ancient societies, 
and the life of the individual was strongly influenced by the public interests. In the Medieval 
Age there was no privacy as a societal value in today’s sense, the individual existed as a member 
of a community, so his/her private life was affected by the constant “monitoring” conducted by 
other members. The appearance of “real” privacy relates to the transformation of these small 
communities: the appearance of cities. During the 19th century the new changes in the economy 
and in the society led to the transformation of the way people lived and these new changes had 
consequences for privacy too, as physical and mental privacy were separated and started to 
evolve in two different ways. Due to urbanization, the population of cities started to grow and 
it led to the physical loss of privacy as people in cities had to live in crowded places. On the 
other hand, citizens could experience a new “type” of privacy, as they ceased to live under the 
always watching eyes of their village neighbours and the constant moral control set up by them 
[8]. Another very important change was the appearance and growth of (tabloid) newspapers, 
which were a fertile area for gossip and photojournalism [9]. It was Samuel D. Warren and 
Louis D. Brandeis who first recognized the threats to privacy caused by the technological and 
societal developments in their famous article The Right to Privacy in 1890. 
 
2.1 Warren and Brandeis: The right to privacy 
 
Warren’s and Brandeis’ The Right to Privacy (published in the Harvard Law Review in 1890) 
became a famous article among legal scholars; “unquestioned ‘classics” [10], the “most 
influential law review article of all” [11]. In their study the authors argued that as political, 
social and economic changes occur in the society, the law has to evolve and create new rights 
in order to “meet the demand of society” and ensure the full protection of the person and the 
property [12]. 
They recognized two phenomena that posed a threat to privacy: technological development 
(namely instantaneous photographs) and gossip, which became a trade in newspapers [13]. 
Considering these changes, they were the first to demand the recognition of the right to privacy 
(which they defined as “the right to be let alone”) as a separate and general right, as a right 
which ensured protection against not the violation of property rights, but the mere emotional 
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suffering [14]. Warren and Brandeis defined an already existing common law right as a stepping 
stone to the right to be let alone, such as the right to determine to what extents the thoughts, the 
sentiments and emotions of the individual shall be communicated to others. The principle of 
this right was the “inviolate personality” [15]. The right to be let alone basically ensured 
protection against the unwanted disclosure of private facts, thoughts, emotions, etc. [16] 
The Right to Privacy influenced the law especially in the US, where this article is regarded as 
the origin of the four privacy torts that emerged from the US case law [17]. This huge success 
can be also due to the societal and technological changes that made the public opinion in favour 
of accepting the idea of privacy [18]. The article also influenced jurisprudence as numerous 
attempts to define privacy followed [19]. Europe started to examine the right to privacy after 
the US, and created a different kind of protection [20]. 
 
2.2 How to define privacy? 
 
In spite of the several attempts that have been made to define privacy; no universal definition 
of privacy could be created. Despite the fact that the claim for privacy in universal, its concrete 
form differs according to the prevailing societal characteristics, the economic and cultural 
environment [21]. It means that privacy must be reinterpreted in the light of the current era and 
be examined in the current context. 
There are several factors that affect what people consider private. There are huge differences 
between particular societies and cultures, or scientific development can also lead to a different, 
urging need for ensuring the protection of privacy [22]. It depends on the concrete situation, on 
the context: sharing the same information in different situations might be considered private 
differently [23]. American law professor Alan Westin established three levels that affect privacy 
norms: the political, the socio-cultural and the personal level [24]. The individual also plays a 
central role: privacy can be understood as a quasi “aura” around the individual, which 
constitutes the limit between him/her and the outside world [25]. The limits of this aura change 
from context to context and from individual to individual, so from all this individualized and 
changing context an average standard, must be found and this standard can be legally protected. 
Besides this always changing context, numerous attempts to define privacy have been made 
during the last 120 years. However, there is a problem with all these definitions, which Daniel 
Solove explained in one of his articles: their scope is either too narrow or too broad. He 
emphasizes that it does not mean that these concepts lack of merit, the problem is that these 
authors use a traditional method of conceptualizing privacy, and as a result their definitions only 
highlight either some aspects of privacy, or they are too broad and do not give an exact view on 
the elements of privacy [26]. He created six categories for these definitions according to which 
privacy is (1) the right to be let alone, (2) limited access to the self, (3) secrecy, (4) control of 
personal information, (5) personhood and (6) intimacy [27]. I will present a few definitions 
from each category, in order to point out how many types of privacy definition exist and how 
many ways it can be interpreted. As already presented, Warren and Brandeis defined privacy as 
“the right to be let alone” [28]. According to Israeli law professor Ruth Gavison “our interest in 
privacy […] is related to our concern over our accessibility to others: the extent to which we 
are known to others, the extent to which others have physical access to us, and the extent to 
which we are the subject of others' attention.” [29] American jurist and economist Richard 
Posner avoids giving a definition but states “that one aspect of privacy is the withholding or 
concealment of information.” [30] From among the authors who consider privacy as a control 
over personal information, Alan Westin and American professor Charles Fried must be 
mentioned. Westin defined privacy as “the claim of an individual to determine what information 
about himself or herself should be known to others” [31] while Fried stated that „privacy […] 
is the control we have over information about ourselves.” [32] American Edward Bloustein 
259 
argued that intrusion into privacy has a close connection with personhood, individuality and 
human dignity [33]. American professor Tom Gerety understands privacy as “the control over 
or the autonomy of the intimacies of personal identity” [34]. I hope to succeed in pointing out 
in how many different ways privacy can be interpreted and how many aspects of privacy exist. 
As all these definitions state something very important about what we should consider private, 
it is an extremely hard task to attempt to create a uniform definition of privacy. 
In my opinion one of the definitions that best describes what privacy is is the one created by 
Máté Dániel Szabó, Hungarian jurist, who argued that “privacy is the right of the individual to 
decide about himself/herself” [35]. This concept might involve a lot of aspects of what we 
consider as private, as almost all the above mentioned definitions can be categorized into it. 
According to my current opinion these headings defined by Solove can be understood as the 
main elements when it comes to the content of privacy, as knowing all these definitions, it gives 
us a clue what areas of life does privacy cover, and it can help us to broaden and to improve our 
instincts on privacy. So in my opinion, combining Szabó’s definition with Solove’s categories 
and not forgetting about the on-going change of context brings us the closest to the concept of 
privacy. However, even with Szabó’s definition, the concept of privacy still remains too vague 
and abstract for defining the object of the legal protection of the right to privacy. Adding the 
characteristic that privacy must be interpreted according to the current societal-economic 
structures, the task of creating an exhaustive legal notion of privacy seems impossible. In spite 
of these uncertainties, several international legal documents acknowledge the right to privacy. 
However, the question arises: how (and whether) an effective legal protection can be ensured 
when the subject of the protection cannot be determined exactly? 
 
3. The legal regulation of the right to privacy 
 
From the second part of the 20th century several international legal documents acknowledged 
the right to privacy as a first generation fundamental human right, which protection then 
appeared in the national legislations of the countries adopting these documents. These 
documents do not give further guidance on what privacy is, it is the case law of courts 
safeguarding these regulations which defines the exact content of privacy and the aspects of life 
which can be considered private. In my study I will focus on the international regulation, 
especially on the European norms. After the appearance of computers in the 70s, it was 
questioned whether the right to privacy is capable of ensuring the protection of private life, and 
this technological change led to the appearance of a separate right whose subject is also the 
protection of private life: the right to data protection. 
Several international human rights conventions have dispositions concerning the right to 
privacy both at the universal and at the regional level. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (United Nations, 1948), Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (United Nations, 1966), Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights 
(Council of Europe, 1950) and Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (2000) state that the right to privacy is a fundamental human right and everyone has the 
right for his/her private and family life, home and correspondence to be respected, and they have 
the right to protect themselves against such unlawful interference. However, these dispositions 
are very brief and they do not give detailed guidance on what privacy is or what aspects of 
privacy must be legally protected. It is the case law, the decisions of the courts that monitor the 
application of these conventions that can provide answers for these questions. Two regional 
organisations have to be mentioned, both of them having an elaborate system and regulation: 
the Council of Europe (hereinafter referred to as CoE) and the European Union. It is the Council 
of Europe’s European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as ECtHR) and the 
European Union’s European Court of Justice (hereinafter referred to as CJEU) which created a 
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detailed case law that I will present in the next part of my paper. First, the practice of the CoE 
will be discussed, as the European Convention of Human Rights was accepted decades before 
the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
The European Court of Human Rights created a very important case law regarding private life. 
The European Convention of Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as ECHR) states in Article 
8 that: 
 
“Right to respect for private and family life 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such 
as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.” 
 
The ECtHR examines two conditions in its decisions: (1) whether there was an interference 
with the right to respect for private life under Paragraph 1 of Article 8; (2) was the interference 
legitimate according to Paragraph 2? I will focus on the first issue because it will give us the 
answer what aspects are considered to be private in general [36]. The ECtHR stated that no 
exhaustive definition of private life can be stated, as Article 8 covers very broad areas of life 
[37]. Also, the technological and scientific developments that appeared after the adoption of the 
ECHR encouraged the ECtHR to create a flexible interpretation of private life under the current 
circumstances [38]. The ECtHR stated in its case law that interference in the following 
conditions of life fell under the scope of Article 8 (and further examined whether the 
interference was legitimate or not as it is not an absolute right): access to personal data [39], 
telephone interception [40], choice or change of name [41], sexual life [42], profession or 
domicile [43], protection against environmental nuisances [44], the right to establish and 
develop relationships with others [45]. It must be emphasized that this is not an exhaustive list. 
In addition, the preamble of the ECHR declares not only the maintenance of these fundamental 
rights, but also their development [46]. It implies that with the always changing societal-
economic conditions, what falls under the scope of Article 8 changes also. In my opinion the 
ECtHR succeeded in creating a flexible case law regarding the content of privacy. 
The European Court of Justice’s judgement is strongly influenced by the ECtHR for several 
reasons. The wording of Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights was based on Article 8 
of the ECHR, the CJEU refers many times intentionally to the practice of the ECtHR [47], and 
Article 52. 3. of the Charter states that concerning the rights which also appear in the ECHR 
the meaning and scope of the right mean the same in the Charter too. The result is the fact that 
the content of privacy can be derived from the case law of the ECtHR [48]. 
Throughout the history of privacy it could be seen that its development cannot be separated 
from the innovations of technology. From the 70s, due to the new technologies, it was obvious 
that the ECHR had some serious limitations. These limitations consisted especially in the 
uncertain scope of the application, as there was no definition of privacy, and that it protected 
the individual against the state interference, not providing horizontal effect and providing no 
protection for ordinary data [49]. This led to the appearance of the right to data protection, 
which aims to protect the individual in the age of the information society. The CoE addressed 
several times the issue of data protection invoking Article 8 of the ECHR [50] and in 1981 it 
adopted the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing 
of Personal Data (Convention 108), while within the EU the data protection directive [51] and 
the data protection regulation [52] were adopted. 
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It is not the aim of this study to present a detailed distinction of these two rights, I would like 
to draw attention only to the most important facts about them. In spite of the formal distinction 
between these two rights, when it comes to their content there are overlaps, meaning that data 
protection is wider and narrower than privacy and vice versa. Data protection is wider, as the 
data protection regulation applies to all kind of personal data processing, even when privacy is 
not infringed. It is also more specific as not all data processing is related to the private sphere 
of the individual. Privacy is also wider and more specific, as it might apply to the processing of 
not personal data, but still influencing privacy; but its regulation does not apply to all data 
processing, as it does not apply to processing which does not interfere with the individual’s 
privacy [53]. Another very important difference is that while privacy is a more abstract right, 
the right to data protection has a detailed regulation, with definitions, principles, dispositions 
etc. 
 
4. Recent challenges of privacy protection 
 
In spite of the existing legal regulation and the appearance of the right to data protection, privacy 
protection meets new challenges constantly. We live in a world where privacy is threatened by 
many ways in our everyday lives. It is enough to think of Internet use, smartphones, social 
networks, drones, biometric identification, the Internet of things – where were all these 
innovations at the time of the creation of the existing regulation? Solove states that it is almost 
impossible today to live without any record being taken of us [54]. Why does monitoring have 
such an importance to our privacy? Monitoring always existed; it is a socially accepted 
phenomenon, which was already present in small communities when people watched their 
neighbours all the time exercising moral pressure, enforcing the moral norms of the community 
[55]. Nowadays the significant difference in monitoring is that we are not only being watched, 
but the information obtained about us is recorded, stored, and more and more aspects of our 
lives are recorded this way (e.g. security cameras, paying with credit cards, buying airplane 
tickets, etc.) [56]. The development of computer technology also makes it possible to store 
information without limits to the amount, to the scope of analysis or to the duration of its 
storage. The collected information can be organized in a systematic order, be transferred 
instantly, etc. [57] 
Nowadays we live in the era of the information society, which has a huge impact on our lives. 
According to Szabó, this phenomenon has several impacts on privacy, too. On the one hand, the 
private sphere of someone becomes more open, as the new developments make more intrusion 
into it, more and more aspects of private life can be reached or touched through technologies. 
On the other hand, the individual becomes more closed in the offline world as people tend to 
withdraw, their relationships become less personal, as more areas of life are conducted online. 
Due to the technological development and the new possibilities brought by it, it is even possible 
to have a complete life online: to work, have friends, do the shopping etc. As a consequence, in 
the society the individual is determined not by himself/herself, but it is the information obtained 
about him/ her that determines him/her. The individual becomes virtual, as he/she does not exist 
in his/her real physical integrity to a lot of his/her relations, but he/she is a group of data, from 
which the recipient identifies the individual. In spite of this virtualization, the individual still 
stays a real being, but in the outside world he/she is identified as a set of data, and the outside 
world finds it difficult to accept that this online person they interact with is a real individual in 
the offline world [58]. 
In the light of these new developments I would like to draw attention to the shortcomings of the 
current regulation and make some recommendations to solve the problem. One very important 
issue is the non-existence of the definition of the subject of protection. I argue that no exhaustive 
legal definition of privacy can be created. However, without knowing what privacy is, it is hard 
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to ensure an effective legal protection against infringements. The other issue concerning privacy 
protection is that the existing privacy regulations protect the individual against the state or the 
public institutions better than against other individuals or private sector institutions [59]. In the 
era of Internet use, not only the traditional way of communication has completely been 
transformed – people can share the most intimate moments of their (or others’) lives without 
almost any limits (it is enough to think of the extreme popularity of social networks) – but the 
monitoring by private institutions for profit oriented reasons is also very common and severe. 
This results in the fact that a huge part of privacy problems and monitoring are created not only 
by the state or its institutions, but by business entities, other users or – the newest aspect of the 
problem – by the individual himself/herself. There might exist national legislations which 
regulate the question of privacy protection better, still, due to the importance of the subject in 
the era of globalisation and rapid technological developments, national legislation is not 
enough, an effective international regulation is also needed. 
According to my current opinion the solution is three-fold. The first element is keeping the 
flexible interpretation of privacy and accepting that no exhaustive definition can be made. Still, 
some core elements of privacy must be defined. In my opinion combining Solove’s method of 
conceptualizing privacy with Szabó’s definition and adding the ECtHR’s flexible and 
contextual interpretation can bring us the closest to the concept of privacy. I suggest 
understanding privacy as the control over the autonomy of the individual. This control means 
especially the right to be let alone, to decide about our accessibility to others, to withhold or 
conceal information, to control the information related to the individual, to preserve our 
personhood and to control the intimacies of personal identities, interpreted in the light of the 
actual context, namely the traditions, customs and norms. The second element is to 
acknowledge the responsibility of businesses and individuals. By that I mean introducing 
privacy infringements caused by private entities or businesses into the regulation (horizontal 
effect) and emphasizing the responsibility of the individual by educating them or raising their 
awareness. I agree with David Flaherty, who emphasizes the responsibility of the individual in 
this technologically advanced world, where there are a lot of devices that might pose [60] a 
threat to privacy. He says: “[y]ou have to be your own privacy commissioner. And you have to 
decide, in your own life, to the extent that you can do it, where you want to draw the line 
between openness and candour; or, to what extent you want to control your personal privacy. 
You reflect on it: all of us protect our personal privacy day in and day out by various strategies 
that we have developed.” [61] This brings us to the third element of the solution: taking into 
consideration the technology itself, and the user’s responsibility. The education of users about 
technology is a key issue, as in many cases privacy infringement is caused by the lack of 
knowledge regarding the use and effects of new technologies [62]. So while the regulation itself 
should remain technology neutral, attention should be paid to the popular devices either by 
adopting special regulations (and by strengthening the principle of privacy impact assessment 
or privacy by design) or by educating the users themselves on informatics, on how these new 
devices work and can be used. Despite the serious doubts whether users are capable to control 
their own privacy [63], in my opinion educating them on basic informatics and raising their 
awareness are still very important. I believe that by introducing all these dispositions, we can 
contribute to the better protection of privacy in the 21st century. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Despite the very long history of privacy, after several centuries it is still a very topical question. 
Legal scholars were very interested in defining privacy and the right to privacy, then 
international and regional legal human rights conventions also regulated the question. However, 
some problems concerning privacy protection still exist and there are still a lot to do: it is 
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especially the lack of the definition of privacy and the lack of horizontal effect which should be 
revised in the light of the innovations of the 21st century. As a result of my study I found that 
the possible solutions may be the following. First, a flexible interpretation of the notion of 
privacy is needed. Second, protection should be guaranteed against not only the state but also 
business entities and/or individuals. And third, technology itself must be taken into 
consideration, still staying technologically neutral at the level of the regulation, but enforcing 
principles like privacy impact assessment, and giving more importance to the education of the 
users. 
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